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I.

INTRODUCTION

An essential element of our system of justice is an independent,
impartial adjudicator.' Only when this element is present can we believe
that decisions will be made on a fair and impartial basis and that justice
has been done.2 The requirement of a neutral decisionmaker "helps to
guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of
an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law."3 Without
this requirement, all of the other components of due process in our
system, such as the right to an attorney, a hearing, a transcript, and to
cross-examine witnesses, become useless and meaningless.4 Indeed, due
process of law requires not only freedom from partiality, but also the
appearance of impartiality.' Hence, many statutes and judicial codes seek
to prevent one who has a conflict of interest, is biased, or who appears
to be biased, from adjudicating a case.'
In jurisprudence, however, a well-accepted exception exists to this
standard. This exception is known as the Rule of Necessity and can be
traced back to the 15th century.7 It provides that "[i]f no judge can be
found who possesses the requisite degree of impartiality in regard to a
particular case, [then] the original judge assigned to the case need not be
disqualified despite his or her partiality."' This exception is invoked by

1. Leslie W. Abramson, Specifng GroundsforJudicialDisqualificationin FederalCourts,
72 NEB. L. REv. 1046,1046 (1993); Seth E. Bloom, JudicialBias and FinancialInterestas Grounds
for Disqualificationof FederalJudges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 662, 662 (1985).
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951); Abramson,
supra note 1, at 1046.
3. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
4. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, AdjudicatoryIndependence and the Values of
ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 476 (1986).
5. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968); In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir.
1992).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990).
7. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 5.03 (1995). The Rule of
Necessity as used in this Note should not be confused with another rule of necessity that exists in
legal ethics. The ethical "rule of necessity" causes a presumption that a conflict of interest exists
when an attorney must confront an opposing client with whom the attorney has had a substantial
previous relationship. See Vangsness v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1984). Another
rule ofnecessity exists in evidentiary matters where a prosecutor must demonstrate the unavailability
of a declarant before a court will allow hearsay to be admitted. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
65 (1980).
8. SHAMAN ETAL., supranote 7, § 5.03; see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1990).
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courts today in cases concerning judicial salaries, 9 taxpayers and
ratepayers of utilities,'0 and class action suits where all judges in a
given court are affected by the outcome." The Rule of Necessity is
applied not only by the courts, but also by federal administrative
agencies that have exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters. 2 It is also
used by local boards that can terminate employees from their jobs" or
impeach local officials,' 4 and by the chief executive of a state to justify
his legitimacy in deciding whether a convicted felon lives or dies. 5
However, the Rule of Necessity should not be invoked as often as
it is today. In most cases, alternatives should be explored before a
decisionmaker invokes the Rule to justify acting where a conflict of
interest occurs or where impartiality is questioned. 6
Part II of this Note traces the movement over the last 300 years that
has sought to prevent judges from hearing cases in which they may have
an interest. Part III examines the history of the Rule of Necessity and its
current applications in judicial, administrative, and executive
decisionmaking contexts. This Part also concludes that the Rule should
not be applied as often as it is. Part IV contains several proposals to
reduce the number of instances in which the Rule is applied.

9. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 202 (1980); Kremer v. Barbieri, 411 A.2d 558,
560 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), affid, 417 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1980).
10. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794,795 (10th Cir. 1980); In re
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 360 (4th Cir. 1976); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
District Court, 778 P.2d 667 (Colo.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 983 (1989).
II. In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925, 930 n.9 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that a judge could
have applied the Rule of Necessity to justify ruling in a class action civil rights suit); In re JohnsManville Corp., 43 B.R. 765, 770 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (allowing the judge to rule in an asbestos
class action suit in which all judges in the Southern District of New York were exposed to the
asbestos via the courthouse).
12. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Annotation, Necessity as Justifying Action
by Judicial or Administrative Officer Otherwise Disqualifiedto Act in ParticularCase, 39 A.L.R.
1476, 1479-80 (1925) [hereinafter Annotation].
13. See Nieszner v. Minnesota Dep't of Jobs and Training, 499 N.W.2d 832, 834 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993); Ginsberg v. Minnesota Dep't of Jobs and Training, 481 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); Barker v. Secretary of State's Office, 752 S.W.2d 437,438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Martin
v. Platt, 594 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Div. 1993); Vesely v. Town of New Windsor, 455 N.Y.S.2d 289,
290 (App. Div. 1982).
14. See Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State
ex rel. Powell v. Wallace, 718 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
15. See Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F. Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 23 F.3d 1477 (8th Cir.
1994).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 101-11.
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]1. THE ROOTS OF IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATION

A.

English Common Law

The use of an independent adjudicator in resolving disputes has long
been a foundation in the Anglo-American system of law.17 In the
common law, the doctrine Nemo Judex in re sua 18 was so central that
"Lord Coke insisted upon a court's right to invalidate acts of Parliament
that ignored it."' 9
An example of its importance was demonstrated in Dr Bonham'
Case'0 where a graduate of Cambridge University was imprisoned by
the Board of Censors of the Royal College of Physicians ("Board") for
refusing to yield to competency tests.2 ' If the Board had found Bonham
incompetent, it would have been authorized by statute to impose a fine
on him, one-half of which would go to the college itself.' In a false
imprisonment action brought against the Board, Lord Coke held that the
statute in question could not grant the Board the authority to levy fines.
The Board was an interested party2 3because it would reap a financial
benefit by finding the doctor guilty.
The common-law, however, confined disqualification of judges to
cases of direct pecuniary interest.24 Disqualification due to bias of a
judge was not permitted. 5
B. American Origins
The concept that an independent and impartial adjudicator of
disputes is essential to a system of justice was instilled in the United

17. See John P. Frank, Disqualificationof Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947); Redish &
Marshall, supra note 4, at 479-81.
18. "[N]o man is to be a judge in his own cause." Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 479;
see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal, 10 Eng. Rep. 301,
305 (H.L. 1852). It is also expressed as Nemo unquam judicet in se. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1039 (6th ed. 1990). This sentiment was also shared by the Founders of the American Republic. See
infra note 28.
19. Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 479-80; see also Frank, supra note 17, at 610.
20. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.1610).
21. Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 480.
22. 77 Eng. Rep. at 648.
23. Id. at 651-52; Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 480.
24. See Frank, supra note 17, at 609.
25. Id. at 612.
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States at the beginning of the Republic.2 6 By providing for life tenure
on good behavior, Article III of the Constitution provides for federal
judges to be insulated from political pressures and political removal that
result from partisan concerns.27 The Founders believed that only an
independent judiciary could truly provide a system of justice that would
protect the rights of all.28
C. Due ProcessJustifications
An impartial adjudicator also is essential to preserving due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.29
The right to notice, counsel, the opportunity to be heard, and the
confrontation of witnesses
do not assure fairness if no impartial
30
decisionmaker exists.
One of the first cases by the United States Supreme Court that
stressed the importance of judicial impartiality is Tumey v. Ohio.3 In
Tumey, the defendant had been convicted and fined for unlawful

26. Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 480.
27. "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
28. "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly
bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason,
a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time ....
THE FEDERALIST No.
10, at 18 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966).
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution.
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so
much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the
faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing
men or the influence of particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves; and which, though they speedily give place to better information and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations
in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
Id. No. 78, at 228, 230-31 (Alexander Hamilton).
29. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821-22 (1986); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 475.
30. Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 476.
31. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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possession of an intoxicating liquor by the mayor of a small village in
Ohio. Under the Ohio statute, one-half of any fine collected went to the
state, and the other half went to the village.3" The village had an ordinance which provided that the mayor would receive his own personal
costs from the village's share, which in this case amounted to twelve
dollars.33 The Court held that a system where a judge is paid only when

he convicts is unconstitutional because a defendant is deprived of his due
process of law when his liberty or property is subjected to a judge who

has a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a
conclusion against him in his case."34 Only when the costs are so small
that they may be considered remote and de minimis can they possibly be
allowed.3 5

What is most interesting about this case is the Court's finding that
a violation of due process occurs only when a judge has a financial
interest in a case.36 As far as the Constitution is concerned, other types
of bias may be permissible.37 While later cases have upheld the concept

that a pecuniary interest by a judge in a case clearly violates due
process, 38 these cases have been vague as to whether other biases also
violate the right.39
D.

Statutory Basis

Three federal statutes govern the circumstances under which a

federal judge can be prevented from hearing and deciding a case due to

32. Id. at 517.
33. Id. at 519, 523.

34. Id. at 523.
35. Id. at 531.
36. Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 500. This holding reflects the common law view of
when a judge should be disqualified. See Frank, supra note 17, at 609-12.
37. "All questions ofjudicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be matters
merely of legislative discretion." Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.
38. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,242 (1980); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564,
570-71 (1973); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 n.3 (1986) (holding that
a slight pecuniary interest in a case will not require disqualification under due process).
39. See Aetna Life Ins., 475 U.S. at 821 (holding that "only in the most extreme of cases
would disqualification on [that] basis be constitutionally required," without saying what those cases
would be); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (holding that "[f]aimess of course requires
an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases" and "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice"
in ruling that a single person cannot act both as a judge and a grand jury in a case). But see Redish
& Marshall, supra note 4, at 500-02 (noting that the Court is reluctant to find due process violations
for personal bias and has never found it for predisposition to facts or law in a case).
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a conflict of interest.4" The first statute, 28 U.S.C. § 4741 simply
codifies the principle that a case may be reviewed on appeal only by
someone other than the original decisionmaker.42
Significant differences exist between the remaining two statutes, 28
U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, although facially they appear to be more
procedural than substantive.43 Section 144" contains more narrow
restrictions because it applies only to federal district court judges and
requires a party to timely file an affidavit stating facts sufficient to
establish bias.45 Courts have required a "'clear and convincing'
standard to invoke the statute based on the allegations, which are viewed

in light of whether they "'would convince a reasonable man that bias
exists."" 6 These standards balance the requirement of the statute that
the facts stated in the affidavit must be taken as true, even if the judge
knows them to be false.4 7 Although section 144 appears to allow the
parties one challenge for cause of a judge in each case,4 8 the statute in
practice is more protective of a judge's ability to sit since the time limit

for making the challenge and the affidavits alleging bias are strictly
construed.4 9

40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144, 455 (1994); Bloom, supra note 1, at 665; Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 589, 628-30 (1987).
41. "No judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by

him." 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1994).
42. See Stempel, supra note 40, at 628.
43. See United States v. Peltier, 553 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D.N.D. 1982).
44. Section 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall
proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term
at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file
it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be
accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994).
45. Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualfing
FederalDistrictCourt Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 706 (1987).
46. Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973)).
47. Id. at 706-07.
48. See supra note 44 for text of the act.
49. Bloom, supra note 1, at 667; Stempel, supra note 40, at 629; see also Berger v. United
States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (holding that a judge is not automatically disqualified by the allegations
of bias in the affidavit even though they are presumed to be true). According to Berger, the judge
must first determine if the allegations are legally sufficient to prove bias, and if so, he is disqualified.
Id. at 36. A legally sufficient affidavit "must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that
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Section 45550 applies to all judges and justices, and is not restricted
to cases of personal bias or prejudice." It provides for recusal even

may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment." Id. at 33-34. The court was concerned that
automatic disqualification had a potential for abuse and could lead to judge shopping. Id. at 35.
50. Section 455 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer
has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case
in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial
interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(e) No justice, judge, or magistrate shall accept from the parties to the proceeding
a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the
ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted
provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.
(f) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any justice, judge,
magistrate, or bankruptcy judge to whom a matter has been assigned would be
disqualified, after substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the
appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that he or she
individually or as a fiduciary, or his or her spouse or minor child residing in his or her
household, has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is not required if the justice,
judge, magistrate, bankruptcy judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests
himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
51. Bloom, supra note 1, at 670-71.
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absent a showing of bias or prejudice "so long as the movant can
demonstrate that a reasonable person could entertain serious doubts as to
the judge's impartiality." 2

Section 455 was enacted in 1974 to replace the previous statute,53
which had been criticized for being vague and contradictory.5 4 The most
significant change was transforming the standard for disqualification from
a subjective to an objective one by removing the phrase "in his opinion"
and substituting "which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."55 The new statute also eliminated the "duty to sit" doctrine.56
That doctrine required that a judge decide borderline questions of recusal

in favor of presiding over a case.5
Although the grounds for disqualification under section 144 are set

forth in section 455,58 section 455 does not require an affidavit to be
filed. Nor does section 455 impose a time requirement or require a
certificate of counsel or record to certify that the motion has been made
in good faith.59 Unlike section 144, section 455 is also "self-enforcing"
for it places the burden on the judge to recuse himself sua sponte if any
of the specified circumstances are present. 60
Section 455 is divided into two parts.61 Section 455(a) provides
that any judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 62 This "appearance of
bias" standard mandates disqualification when a reasonable person could

52. Stempel, supra note 40, at 629-30; see Abramson, supra note 1,at 1051-52.
53. The previous statute provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any case in
which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has been a material witness,
or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper,
in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352.
54. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355 (stating that the purpose of the revisions
were to "promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by saying, in effect,
if there is a reasonable factual basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify
himself and let another judge preside over the case"); Bloom, supra note 1,at 672.
55. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 53, at 5,reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355; Bloom,
supra note 1,at 673; Adam J.Safer, Note, The Illegitimacy ofthe ExtrajudicialSource Requirement
for JudicialDisqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 787, 795 (1993).
56. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 53, at 5, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355; Bloom,
supra note 1,at 673; Safer, supra note 55, at 796.
57. Safer, supra note 55, at 796.
58. United States v. Peltier, 553 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D.N.D. 1982).
59. 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1994).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b); Bloom, supra note 1, at 671; Hoekema, supra note 45, at 698.
61. Abramson, supra note 1, at 1048; Bloom, supra note 1, at 672.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
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merely question ajudge's impartiality, regardless of whether bias actually
exists.63 Section 455(b) enumerates specific situations where a judge
must disqualify him or herself from the matter.64 In particular, section
455(b)(1) incorporates the standard of section 144 by requiring recusal
when the judge has an actual bias towards a party in the case, or has
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings.6 5 Other portions of section 455(b) prevent a judge from
hearing cases where: the judge previously served as a lawyer in the
matter; a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served
as a lawyer, judge, or material witness concerning the matter during their
association;' the judge was formerly in government employment and
served as counsel, adviser, or a material witness concerning the matter,
or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in
question;' the judge, his or her spouse, "a person within the third
degree of relationship to either of them ' 68 or the spouse of such a
person, is a party, lawyer, likely to be a material witness or "[i]s known
by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding" 69 ; or the judge, his or her spouse, or
minor children residing at home have a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy, no matter how small the interest. 70 The statute
also imposes an affirmative duty upon a judge to be informed about his
or her own financial interests and to make a reasonable effort to be
71
informed about the interests of his or her spouse or minor children.

63. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988) (holding that
a district court judge was disqualified from ruling in a case in which the plaintiff was purchasing
land from Loyola University, where the judge was a trustee); Bloom, supranote 1,at 674; Hoekema,
supra note 45, at 708; Safer, supra note 55, at 797.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
65. Id. § 455(b)(I); Stempel, supra note 40, at 630.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2).

67. Id. § 455(b)(3).
68. Id. § 455(b)(5); see also Stempel, supra note 40, at 630 (noting that the provision includes
any relative "short of a cousin").
69. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5).
70. Id.; Unlike other conflicts, a financial conflict cannot be waived by the parties. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(4); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982) (disqualifying a
judge from hearing a case in which his wife held stock in plaintiff companies and did not opt out
of class action suit), ajfd, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); H.R. REP. No. 1453, supranote 53, at 5, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357; Hoekema, supra note 45, at 710.

71. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c).
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E. Ethical Codes
The first ethical code for judges, promulgated by the American Bar
Association ("ABA') in 1924,2 contained several provisions regarding
judicial disqualification due to possible self-interest.73 These Canons
protected against the appearance of partiality and emphasized the need
to avoid activities that might interfere with judicial duties.74 The 1924
Canons, however, were highly criticized 75 and the ABA replaced them
in 1972 with the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which became a
model for judicial codes in all but three states. 76 A section on disqualifi-

72. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 1.02; Steven Lubet, Regulation of Judges' Business and
FinancialActivities, 37 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 (1988); CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETIS (1924). One of the
motivations for formulating these Canons was to respond to United States District Court Judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis' working simultaneously as a federal judge and also as the first commissioner of baseball. He received $42,500 from baseball and $7,500 for being a federal judge. See
JOHN P. MAcKENzm, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 180-81 (1974). Ironically, Landis was also the
judge whose behavior was criticized in Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). See supra
note 49.
73. The ethical canons provided:
A judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative is a party; he
should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly
influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank,
position or influence of any party or other person.
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 13 (1924) (Kinship or Influence).
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which
are apt to be involved in litigation in the court; and, after his accession to the Bench, he
should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to
enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far
as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude
of mind in the administration of his judicial duties.
He should not utilize information, coming to him in a judicial capacity, for
purposes of speculation; and it detracts from the public confidence in his integrity and
the soundness of his judicial judgment for him at any time to become a speculative
investor upon the hazard of a margin.
Id. Canon 26 (Personal Investments and Relations).
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in any judicial act in
which his personal interests are involved. If he has personal litigation in the court of
which he is judge, he need not resign his judgeship on that account, but he should, of
course, refrain from any judicial act in such a controversy.
Id. Canon 29 (Self-Interest).
74. Lubet, supra note 72, at 3.
75. These canons were viewed as emphasizing "moral posturing" and proved to be "more
hortatory than helpful in providing firm guidance for the solution of difficult questions." SHAMAN
ET AL., supra note 7, § 1.02.
76. Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have not adopted the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. Kittie D. Warshawsky, The Judicial Canons: A FirstStep in Addressing Gender Bias in

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

11

Hofstra
Law LAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996], [Vol.
Art. 524:817
HOFSTRA
REVIEW

cation was formulated that outlined instances where a judge should not
hear a case due to an appearance of impartiality, or the existence of
actual bias.77 The amended 28 U.S.C. § 455 was based on the ABA's
197-2 Model Code.7 Although the Model Code was revised in 1990,79

the Courtroom, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1047, 1052 n.25 (1994).
77. The pertinent sections provide:
C. DISQUALIFICATION
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with
whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer
concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to either of them, or the spouse of such a person;
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests, and make a reasonable 'effort to inform himself about the personal financial
interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household.
(3) For the purposes of this section:
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law
system;
D. REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3C(l)(c) or Canon 3C(l)(d) may,
instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his
disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of
the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's relationship is immaterial
or that his financial interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, and may
participate in the proceeding. The agreement signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT Canon 3 (1972). For a detailed discussion of judicial disqualification
under the current code, see LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3
OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1992).
78. H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 53, at 1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6351-52.
The ABA code and § 455 depart sharply in that § 455 does not include a waiver of disqualification
provision if the judge has only a small financial interest in the case at hand. Congress did this
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most states still retain a Code based on the 1972 version."

]II.

RULE OF NECESSITY

A.

History

The origin of the Rule of Necessity is uncertain. The first case to
invoke the Rule can be traced to England in 1430, where it was held that
the Chancellor of Oxford could act as the judge in a case in which he

was also a party since no provision existed for the appointment of
another judge to hear the case." l The Rule was first codified in a 1743
Act of Parliament which provided that justices of the peace were not
disqualified from deciding cases simply because they had a dual status
as taxpayers. 8 Another early example of the Rule was Dimes v. Grand

intentionally because it believed that "confidence in the impartiality of federal judges is enhanced
by a more strict treatment of waiver." 1d. at 7, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6357.
79. The 1990 Code is essentially the same as the 1972 version, with some minor modifications.
Due to some reorganizational changes, the disqualification section has been moved from Canon 3C
to 3E. Section 3E(l)(a) added bias or prejudice against a party's lawyer to the list of disqualifying
circumstances. LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 26-29 (1992).

Section 3E(l)(c) expanded the disqualification to include the economic interests of a spouse, parent,
or child who does not reside with the judge. Id. at 28. Section 3E(l)(d) was revised to state that a
de minimis interest should not disqualify a judge. Id. at 28-29. This revised code illustrates that the
ABA is still at odds with Congress over 28 U.S.C. § 455. The Model Code provides that a de
minimis financial interest should not disqualify a judge from hearing a case and still contains a
provision for a waiver of disqualification, whereas § 455 does not. 28 U.S.C. § 455; MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(E)(1)(c), (F) (1990).

80. The states that have adopted the 1990 ABA code include Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, as well as the Judicial
Conference of the United States. Leslie W. Abramson, DecidingRecusal Motions: WHo Judges the
Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 543, 543 n.1 (1994). Florida has recently adopted the new code as
well. See In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1994).
81. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,213 (1980); FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE 270 (1929); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 5.03.

82. See Frank, supra note 17, at 611. The statute provided:
Whereas Doubts have arisen whether, according to the Laws and Statutes now
in Force, his Majesty's Justices of the Peace may lawfully act in any Case relating to the
Parishes or Places to the Rates and Taxes of which such Justices respectively are rated
or chargeable.., be it enacted ....That it shall and may be lawful to and for all and
every Justice or Justices of the Peace... to make, do and execute all ...Things
appertaining to their Office ...notwithstanding that any such Justice or Justices... is
or are rated to or chargeable with the Taxes, Levies, or Rates within any such... Place
affected ....
Charles Malarkey, Judicial Disqualification: Is Sexual Orientation Cause in California?, 41
HASTINGS LJ. 695, 717 n.141 (1990) (quoting 16 Geo. 2, ch. 18, § 1 (1743) (alterations in
original)).
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Junction Canal,83 in which Lord Chancellor Cottenham was disqualified
from participating in a case because he held shares in a company that
was a party to the litigation. 84 The Vice-Chancellor decided the case
and the Lord Chancellor enrolled the decree for the case to be appealed
to the House of Lords.8 5 The House of Lords concluded that the Lord
Chancellor was disqualified from deciding the merits of the case, but was
by necessity required to "enrol the decree" to make judgment final and
the case appealable.86
In the United States, the Rule of Necessity gained acceptance in the
19th Century.87 Both federal and state courts have accepted the Rule of
Necessity. 88 The United States Supreme Court applied the Rule in
Evans v. Gore, 9 which dealt with the taxability of salaries of federal
judges. 90 Although all of the members of the Court were substantially
affected by the decision, they felt compelled to decide the case.91

83. 10 Eng. Rep. 301 (H.L. 1852); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderationsof
the Aspirationsfor OurJudges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1891 n.41 (1988).
84. See Resnlk, supra note 83, at 1891 n.41.
85. Id.
86. Id. Hence this case does not appear to be a classic example of the Rule of Necessity. The
Lord Chancellor did not actually take part in deciding the merits of the case, but rather took part in
a technical formality to satisfy procedural requirements. See also Thellusson v. Rendlesham, II Eng.
Rep. 172, 211 (H.L. 1859) (noting that although the Lord Chancellor (Lord Chelmsford) had served
as counsel to one of the parties concerning the case at an earlier date, he could have decided the case
if he were the only judge with the authority to hear it).
87. The true rule unquestionably is that wherever it becomes necessary for a judge to sit
even where he has an interest-where no provision is made for calling another in, or
where no one else can take his place-it is his duty to hear and decide, however
disagreeable it may be.
Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 185 (1870) (referring to a case, City of Philadelphia v. American
Philosophical Soc'y, 42 Pa. (6 Wright) 9 (1862), in which judges that were members of the
American Philosophical Society decided whether taxes should be levied against a building utilized
by the Society because they were the only ones who could hear the case); see Commonwealth v.
Ryan, 5 Mass. 89 (1809); In re Leefe, 2 Barb. Ch. 39 (N.Y. Ch. 1846) (holding that although a state
statute prevented the chancellor from sitting in a case in which a relative was a party, the state
constitution required that only the chancellor could hear an appeal from all inferior equity tribunals,
and that therefore the chancellor must decide the case).
88. See Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936).
89. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
90. Id.
91. The Court stated:
Because of the individual relation of the members of this court to the question, thus
broadly stated, we cannot but regret that its solution falls to us; and this although each
member has been paying the tax in respect of his salary voluntarily and in regular course.
But jurisdiction of the present case cannot be declined or renounced. The plaintiff was
entitled by law to invoke our decision on the question as respects his own compensation,
in which no other judge can have any direct personal interest; and there was no other
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The Supreme Court directly addressed the validity of the Rule of
Necessity in United States v. Will.92 Will concerned several acts of
Congress that repealed previously authorized cost-of-living increases for
high-level federal employees, including federal judges.9 3 In response,
thirteen United States District Court judges filed a class action suit
against the United States in the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of
all Article I judges,94 arguing that the statute violated the Compensation Clause of the Constitution." The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and the case was appealed directly to
the Supreme Court.96 Since all the members of the Court had a direct
interest in the case, disqualification statutes would ordinarily have
required that the Members of the Court should recuse themselves.9 7 The
Court held, however, that section 455 did not operate to disqualify the
members of the Court because then the case could not possibly have
been heard since all federal judges were parties to the case.98 The Court
then held that repealing the pay increase for two of the four years
violated the Compensation Clause of the Constitution.99 The case was
remanded to the district court for calculation of the dollar amounts that
the Justices should be compensated.'t°

appellate tribunal to which under the law he could go.
Id. at 247-48. Incidentally, the Court held in Evans that it was unconstitutional to tax the salaries
of federal judges because such a tax violated the Compensation Clause. Id at 264.

92. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
93. Id. at 206-08.
94. Id. at 209.
95. The Compensation Clause provides that federal judges shall receive compensation "which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
96. Will, 449 U.S. at 210.

97. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1994).
98. Will, 449 U.S. at 214-16. In its decision the Court stated that in enacting § 455, Congress
did not intend to alter the Rule of Necessity. Id. at 217. However, the Court inferred that Congress

never intended to alter the Rule on the basis that it was never mentioned in the legislative history.
Id. at 216; see also H.R. REP. No. 1453, supra note 53, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6351
(containing the legislative history of the statute).
99. Will, 449 U.S. at 226. James Madison's concerns were realized by the Justices'
participation in the case. See supra note 28.

100. Id. at 231.
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B.

Modern Applications

1. Judicial
Cases concerning judicial salaries are probably the best example of
when the Rule of Necessity is applied today. 1 The Rule is also used
in cases affecting statewide pensions 2 and requirements for judicial
retirement in the states,103 as well as cases where all citizens of a state,
including the judges, are affected by their status as taxpayers, or as
ratepayers to a single utility."° Under the Rule, judges have been
allowed to sit in cases where they are affected by the status of receiving
a paycheck from the United States government,0" and in class actions
where they may be affected by the outcome. °' The Rule has even been
applied in instances where an attorney who represented a judge in a class
action suit appears before that judge in another matter. 7
More recently, it appears that the Rule is applied most often when
a litigant sues all of the members in a court system with frivolous suits
in an attempt to prevent other cases from being heard,0 8 or when a

101. See Kremer v. Barbieri, 411 A.2d 558 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), aft'd,417 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1980);
see also supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
102. See Board of Trustees v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 1985); Oakley v. Gainer, 331 S.E.2d
846 (W. Va. 1985).
103. See Carey v. Cuomo, 858 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Maresca v. Cuomo, 475 N.E.2d
95 (N.Y. 1984).
104. In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 620 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980); In re
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1976); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
District Court, 778 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1989); see also Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 792 F. Supp. 72 (D.
Alaska 1992) (stating that a judge could not recuse himself from a case concerning the Alaska
Permanent Fund because all state residents, including all other judges, receive payments from the

fund).
105. United States v. Zuger, 602 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 805 (1985).
106. In re City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the judge could have used
the Rule of Necessity to justify ruling in a class action civil rights suit); In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
43 B.R. 765 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (allowing a judge to rule in an asbestos class action suit for all
judges in the Southern District of New York who were exposed to the asbestos via the courthouse).
107. See Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985). For a discussion
of Reilly, see Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Recusal Standardsfor Judges in Pennsylvania: Cause for
Concern, 36 VILL. L. REv. 713, 723-28 (1991).
108. See Guinn v. Finesilver, 48 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1995) (table decision, full text available
in 1995 WL 94651) (invoking the Rule of Necessity when party sued all judges who heard his
cases); In re Complaint of Doe, 2 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1993) (allowing Judicial Council to decide
judicial conduct complaint where many members of the Council were named as respondents); Pilla
v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976) (refusing to allow plaintiffs to prevent their own
prosecution by suing all members of the legal profession); In re Nowak, 143 B.R. 154 (Bankr. N.D.
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litigant threatens all of the members of a court system with physical
harm."° The Rule is also discussed in cases where the defendant in a
criminal action is also a sitting judge, 1 ' as well as in disbarment and
attorney disciplinary hearings where the presiding judges may have
promulgated rules concerning lawyer conduct."1 '
The Rule has not been applied in a number of situations where one
might expect it to be used. For example, the Rule is not applied when a2

chief judge files a suit as the administrator of a state's court system,'

I11.1992) (holding thatjudge was not forced to recuse himself when debtor sued him and many other
judges alleging that they had committed treason); United States v. Van Dyke, 568 F. Supp. 820 (D.
Or. 1983) (disallowing defendants' attempts to disqualify all federal judges when they sued every
one after they attempted to protest taxes by filing frivolous documents with numerous county clerks);
Say & Say v. Castellano, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (Ct. App. 1994) (preventing the plaintiff from
frustrating the ability of the court to adjudicate by filing a case against a judge and hoping for
recusal); Say & Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the
plaintiff was a "vexatious litigant" by filing suit against any judge assigned to their case, and that
therefore dismissal should not be allowed); In re Appointment of Special Judge, 500 N.E.2d 751
(Ind. 1986) (finding that since no reasonable basis existed for defendant's claim against the judge,
the Rule of Necessity would allow such judge to adjudicate the case); Muka v. New York State Bar
Ass'n, 466 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (allowing the Rule of Necessity to preclude recusal of a
judge who had been sued by plaintiff, both individually and as a member of the New York State Bar
Association); State v. Weiner, 651 A.2d 1234 (RI. 1994) (invoking the Rule of Necessity when
defendant had filed suit against all of the justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court); Filan v.
Martin, 684 P.2d 769 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (utilizing the Rule of Necessity to allow a judge to
dismiss a suit in which the plaintiff claimed that immunity for judges and prosecutors was against
the principles of the Declaration of Independence).
109. See United States v. Moody, 762 F. Supp. 1485 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that federal
judges need not recuse themselves when defendant made mail bomb threats to all federal judges);
United States v. Mattison, 731 F. Supp. 831 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (holding that the Rule of Necessity
would prevent disqualification of specific judges when defendant made vague threat to all United
States judges).
110. See United States v. Claibome, 781 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Petition to Inspect and
Copy Grand Jury Materials, 735 F.2d 1261 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,469 U.S. 884 (1984). In Petition
to Inspect, a special committee of federal judges was authorized under 28 U.S.C. 884 (1984) to
investigate charges of bribery against Federal District Court Judge Alcee Hastings. Judge Hastings
argued that since the case aroused issues of concern to all Article III judges, the Judges should have
disqualified themselves under 28 U.S.C. § 455. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that although the judges
were interested, the Rule of Necessity allowed them to investigate the case. Id. at 1266. But see
United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Rule of Necessity did not
allow disqualified judges to sit in rehearing en banc concerning conviction of a federal judge since
other judges were available to hear the case), cert. denied,484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
111. See Anonymous v. Grievance Comm., 527 N.Y.S.2d 248,250 (App. Div. 1988); see also
United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 446 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the Rule of Necessity may
be utilized to allow a judge who was a member of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission to hear
a case dealing with the interpretation of those guidelines).
112. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hash v. McGraw, 376 S.E.2d 634, 637 (W. Va. 1988). In McGraw,
the chiefjustice of the West Virginia Court of Appeals, who is also the "administrative head of all
courts," caused charges to be brought against several attorneys for placing a new judge on the bench
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when a pecuniary interest is so low as to not create a conflict of
interest,' 13 or when "judicial machinery" exists to resolve a potential

conflict of interest.

4

2. Administrative
The Rule of Necessity is also applied in cases where members of an
administrative agency with quasi-judicial powers may adjudicate a matter
before them." 5 Due to the increase in the number of administrative
agencies and the number of cases emanating from them," 6 the Rule of
Necessity is more apt to be invoked in the context of administrative
agencies than in the context of the judiciary."7 In the judicial setting,
alternate judges can hear a suit if a conflict exists with a particular
judge."' In the agency setting, however, legislatures have often given
agencies and boards exclusive jurisdiction in their areas." 9 Therefore,
a dispute cannot be transferred to another tribunal. 0
The United States Supreme Court implicitly allowed the Rule of

without authority. The chief justice was allowed to hear the case when it reached the Supreme Court
of Appeals because he had no personal or pecuniary interest in the matter that could reasonably
affect the impartiality of the court. Thus, under the court's analysis, the Rule of Necessity did not
have to be invoked. Id. at 636-37.
113. See, e.g, Hubby v. Carpenter, 350 S.E.2d 706,706-09 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that because
only a small amount of the city's revenues are gained through fines levied in the mayor's court, no
violation of due process exists, and hence the Rule of Necessity need not be invoked).
114. See State errel. Bardacke v. Welsh, 698 P.2d 462,473-76 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that no extrajudicial source of bias exists that required the trial judge to recuse).
115. Annotation, supra note 12, at 1479-80.
116. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An EmpiricalStudy of
FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 985, 996-97.
117. The due process right to have a fair trial in a fair tribunal applies to agencies in
adjudicatory proceedings just as it does to the judiciary in judicial proceedings. See Amos Treat &
Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
118. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-294 (1994).
119. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 115 S. Ct. 537, 543
(1994) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Federal Election Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act); EEOC v. Commercial
Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 110 (1988) (observing that the EEOC has a 60-day period of
exclusive jurisdiction in matters brought before it); N.L. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 307
(1964) (maintaining the National Labor Relations Board's exclusive jurisdiction); United States v.
Pan American World Airways, 371 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1963) (declaring that the Civil Aeronautics
Board had jurisdiction over certain unfair methods of competition).
120. See, e.g., Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F. Supp. 53, 54 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding that
Congress granted exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over commodity futures and option contracts to
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). The Administrative Procedure Act provides for
hearings to be conducted in an "impartial manner" and provides for the disqualification of a
presiding or participating employee in an adjudicatory setting, but does not provide for the employee
to be replaced after such an occurrence. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994).
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Necessity in the context of administrative agencies in Federal Trade
Commission v. Cement Institute.' In this case, the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") had issued a cease and desist order to seventy-four
cement manufacturers for restraining and hindering competition in the
sale and distribution of cement through a mutual understanding or an
agreement to employ a multiple basing point system of pricing."z As
a result of this agreement, the FTC alleged, cement buyers had been
unable to purchase cement for delivery from any one of the cement
manufacturers at a lower price or on more favorable terms."
One of the defendants complained that the FTC was prejudiced and
biased against the Portland cement industry. 4 The FTC, prior to the
hearing, had filed reports indicating that some of its members believed
that the operation of the multiple basing point system was equivalent to
a price fixing restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act." s Thus, the membership of the FTC had formed an opinion due
to its prior official investigations."2 6
The Court held that if the entire FTC had entertained such views as
the result of its prior ex parte investigations, it would not necessarily
mean that the minds of all its members were irrevocably closed on the
subject. 27 The Court also held that sustaining the defendants' position28
would defeat the congressional intent of the Trade Commission Act.1
If the agency had been disqualified in the proceedings against the
respondents, neither the FTC nor any other governmental agency could
have acted upon the complaint.'29 Congress has provided no substitute
commissioner, nor authorized any other government agency to hold
hearings, make findings, and issue cease and desist orders in proceedings
against unfair trade practices. 30 Hence, the Court in this case was
actually endorsing a "Rule of Necessity" for administrative agencies. 3 '
This practice also occurs frequently on the local level of government. For example, the Rule has been invoked in cases involving local

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

333 U.S. 683 (1948).
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.

131.

See 4 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.9 (2d ed. 1983).

Id.
Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
130. Id.
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school boards, 13 2 discharge of police officers,' 33 employment dismissals,'" and impeachment of executive officials by town boards and city
councils.' 35 The Rule is also invoked by other types of boards and
agencies, such as highway commissions and water authorities, which
make adjudicatory decisions.'3 6 Jurisdictions are split, however, as to
when it is appropriate to apply the Rule. Some hold that if a board is
deadlocked in a decision, or if the law requires a certain number of

members to certify a vote on an issue (such as if six members of an eight
member board are required for an impeachment), then an otherwise

disqualified member may be allowed to act to break the deadlock,'
while other jurisdictions hold that the Rule of Necessity would not be

132. See deKoevend v. Board of Educ., 688 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984); Westbrook v. Board of
Educ., 724 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Allen v. Board of Educ., 559 A.2d 883 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1989); Opdahl v. Zeeland Pub. Sch. Dist., 512 N.W.2d 444 (N.D. 1994). But see Board
of Educ. v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 518 N.E.2d 713, 727 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987) (holding
that the Rule of Necessity is not invoked where a school board has a quorum but is deadlocked on
a decision).
133. Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983); Collura v. Board of Police
Comm'rs, 482 N.E.2d 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985), af3'd, 498 N.E.2d 1148 (Il1. 1986); Adkins v. City
of Tell City, 625 N.E.2d 1298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Town of Georgetown v. Essex County
Retirement Bd., 560 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990); Gay v. City of Somerville, 878 S.W.2d 124
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).
134. Bakalis v. Golembeski, 35 F.3d 318 (7th Cir. 1994); Nieszner v. Minnesota Dep't of Jobs
and Training, 499 N.W.2d 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ginsberg v. Minnesota Dep't of Jobs and
Training, 481 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Barker v. Secretary of State's Office, 752 S.W.2d
437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Martin v. Platt, 594 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Div. 1993); Vesely v. Town of
New Windsor, 455 N.Y.S.2d 289 (App. Div. 1982).
135. Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State ex ret.
Powell v. Wallace, 718 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
136. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. FAA, 772 F.2d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that
the Rule of Necessity could allow the FAA to rule on allowing one airline to buy another's flight
slots); Acme Brick Co. v. Missouri P.R.R., 821 S.W.2d 7, 10-11 (Ark. 1991) (holding that the Rule
of Necessity required the Highway Commission to make a decision even though counsel for a party
in the case simultaneously represented the Commission in another case); Gissel v. Kenmare
Township, 512 N.W.2d 470, 475 n.3 (N.D. 1994) (stating that the Board of Commissioners could
rule to close a road in an eminent domain proceeding, even though members of the Board had a
financial interest in the controversy); Larson v. Wells County Water Resource Bd., 385 N.W.2d 480,
485 (N.D. 1986) (allowing the Water Board to approve a drain project even though the Board
Chairman owned land in the area to be drained).
137. See Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W.2d 52, 60 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
Barker v. Secretary of State's Office, 752 S.W.2d 437, 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). But see Central
Mo. Plumbing Co. v. Plumbers Local Union 35, 908 S.W.2d 366, 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing
to allow the Rule of Necessity to break deadlock where the Labor and Industrial Relations
Commissioner participated in deliberations from the outset instead of waiting to see if a deadlock
would develop).
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allowed to break a deadlock. 3 8 Some jurisdictions require what might
be described as an extreme necessity before allowing an interested board
to adjudicate a matter 39
3. Executive
A corollary of the application of the Rule of Necessity to administrative agencies is its application to situations where an official of the
executive branch of government is the sole adjudicator of an issue. The
best example of this is the clemency hearing, where a governor of a state

is by law the only one who may decide if a convicted felon receives
clemency or not.14 ' A conflict of interest exists when a governor
previously prosecuted a defendant as the attorney general of the state and

then must decide whether that person will receive the death penalty.
However, since the governor is the only one who may decide whether
141
clemency is received, the Rule of Necessity would allow him to act.
to allow a mayor to veto a bill in which
The Rule has also been invoked
142
she had a financial interest.

138. See Board of Educ. v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 518 N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987); Vesely v. Town of New Windsor, 455 N.Y.S.2d 289, 293 (App. Div. 1982); see also
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. STATE ETHICS COMM'N, COMM'N FACT SHEET: THE RULE OF
NECESSITY (Feb. 1993) (outlining circumstances when the Rule of Necessity may and may not be
utilized by town or city boards).
139. See King v. Rothschild, 56 F.3d 80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (table case, full text available in 1995
WL 303977, at *2) (refusing to allow the Merit Systems Protection Board to invoke the Rule of
Necessity when the failure of the Board to act would not have a "substantial impact on the
administration of the civil service"). Alabama has consistently held that the Rule of Necessity may
only be utilized in situations of "paramount importance." If a board is unable to adjudicate a matter
because its members are disqualified, the stalemate should continue since other solutions are
possible, such as the legislature remedying the problem, or the members of the board resigning. See
City of Huntsville v. Biles, 489 So. 2d 509, 515 (Ala. 1986); State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, 103
So. 835, 838 (Ala. 1925).
140. See Pickens v. Tucker, 851 F. Supp. 363, 366 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (citing ARK. CONST.
amend. 6, § 4). For an example of this dilemma in a popular literary work, see JOHN GRIsHAM, THE
CHAMBER (1994).
141. Pickens, 851 F. Supp. at 366. In allowing Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker to act on
a clemency petition in which he had personally participated as attorney general, the Pickens court
relied on a case where the previous governor, Bill Clinton, had made a clemency decision. In that
death penalty case, Clinton had previously appeared as attorney general. Id. at 365.
142. See Affordable Hous. Alliance v. Feinstein, 224 Cal. Rptr. 557, 561 (Ct. App. 1986)
(allowing the Mayor of San Francisco to veto a rent-control ordinance in which she had a financial
interest).
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C. The Rule's Weaknesses
Although the Rule of Necessity has been well-accepted -by many

courts, it is not without fault.14 The Rule, as best demonstrated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Will,'" contradicts not only
145
28 U.S.C. § 455 and the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
but also a long history of jurisprudence that has sought to eliminate even
the appearance of impropriety or bias in judicial proceedings. 46 It is

inappropriate for a judge to decide a case after they know that their
impartiality is questioned. 47
The Will decision is disturbing for the Court never addressed the
issue ofjust how "necessary" it was to hear a case that involved whether
their salaries would receive an increase. 48 The Court never explored,
or even suggested that Congress could explore, other options that could
be used in the future. 49
The Rule also creates problems when it is invoked by administrative
agencies and executive branch officials. The Rule allows officials who
have a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of a matter to vote on it
anyway. 5 It also allows, in some cases, the public official responsible

143. See John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment,and Process Values, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV.
657, 670-71 (1994) (stating that the Rule "appears to stand on a flimsy foundation" for it "represents
a degree of judicial deference to the political branches clearly exceeding reasonable separation-ofpower demands" and "could produce a positivistic version of due process"); Kenneth F. Warrren,
Adjudication, in HANDBOOK OF REGULATION AND ADMIISTRATIVE LAW 255 (David H. Rosenblum
& Richard D. Schwartz eds., 1994) (noting that "[t]he rule of necessity, based in common law, is
controversial because the doctrine appears blatantly to defy common sense").
144. See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
145. See supra notes 77, 79. The commentary to the ABA's Model Code recognized but did
not criticize the Rule of Necessity:
By decisional law, the rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification.
For example, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial
salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate
judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In
the latter case, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and use reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as
practicable.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) commentary (1990).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
147. See Resnik, supra note 83, at 1894.
148. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980) (holding, instead, that since Congress
never demonstrated any intent of altering the Rule of Necessity, it must still be in effect).
149. See Resnik, supra note 83, at 1892-94. For examples of other options, see infra text
accompanying notes 159-60.
150. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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for sentencing a person to death to decide whether that penalty is
ultimately carried out.' Other alternatives should at least be explored.
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE RULE
A.

Federal Cases

It is rare for the Rule to be invoked on the federal level because a
case can usually be assigned to another judge in a district and can even
be assigned to judges in other circuits if the need arises. 5 However,
no alternative exists to the Rule of Necessity when a case similar to Will
presents itself. Yet, this does not mean that no other possible solution
may be explored.
The dilemma confronting the federal judges in Will could have been
circumvented by relying exclusively on the state judiciaries whose judges
would not have been predisposed to either side in the case, and would
have been fully competent and obligated to adjudicate issues of federal
constitutional law.'53 This approach, however, would deprive the
system of one uniform, dispositive judicial resolution of a constitutional
issue since judges in the fifty states could come to different decisions." 4 Hence, since consistency in interpretation is so important, such
a result would be undesirable. 55

151. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
152. The relevant statute provides:
(a) The Chief Justice of the United States may . . . designate and assign

temporarily any circuit judge to act as circuit judge in another circuit upon request by the
chief judge or circuit justice of such circuit.
(b) The chief judge of a circuit or the circuit justice may, in the public interest,
designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge within the circuit, including a judge
designated and assigned to temporary duty therein, to hold a district court in any district
within the circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 291(a)-(b) (1994).
(b) The chief judge of a circuit may, in the public interest, designate and assign
temporarily any district judge of the circuit to hold a district court in any district within
the circuit.
(d) The Chief Justice of the United States may designate and assign temporarily
a district judge of one circuit for service in another circuit, either in a district court or
court of appeals, upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge or
circuit justice of the circuit wherein the need arises.
Id. § 292 (b), (d).
153. Redish & Marshall, supra note 4, at 492.
154. Id. at 493.
155. Id.
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Another alternative would be to create a panel of retired federal
judges to decide such a case where judicial salaries may be at question.'56 Because retired judges are called from time to time to adjudicate matters, 5 7 no conflict of interest or constitutional problems exist

in matters such as this. However, this solution would not work in cases
that affect pension and retirement payments since this would affect both
5
retired and sitting judges. 1
One possible solution is to have a panel of state supreme court
judges hear and adjudicate a federal case on the very rare occasions when
such a conflict occurs. This panel could be appointed by the President
and approved by the Senate. 9 This solution would, however, breach
the separation between federal and state authority in certain matters and
hence would be unconstitutional as a violation of Article I of the
Constitution.'" Although a constitutional amendment would be required to allow such a proposal, the only alternative would be to have an
adjudicator hear and decide a dispute with the appearance of impropriety.
A possible amendment to cure the constitutional problems could read:
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
TO ELIMINATE THE RULE OF NECESSITY IN THE JUDICIAL CONTEXT.

SECTION 1. Upon the presentation of a certificate of necessity
from the Chief Justice of the United States, the President shall appoint

a requisite number of justices necessary to adjudicate a case within the
judicial power of the United States. Such appointment shall be selected
from sitting justices of the highest courts of the several States, and be

by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.
SECTION 2. Upon presentation of a certificate of necessity from
the chief judicial official of a State to the Chief Justice of the United
States, the Judicial power of the United States shall extend to cases

156. This alternative would only apply to retired federal judges and not to those who have
moved from regular active service to senior status. Retired judges receive an annuity equal to their
salary at the time they retire, while those in senior status receive the same salary that they did while
they were in office. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). Hence, retired judges could serve as long as
Congress does not change their annuity payments. However, the United States Code would need to
be amended for this change to take place because it currently only allows those in senior status to
continue to perform judicial functions. See id. § 294(b).
157. See e.g., In re Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 576 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.
Fla.), affd, 735 F.2d 1261 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
158. See Board of Trustees v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204, 206 (Ind. 1985); Oakley v. Gainer, 331
S.E.2d 846, 851 (W. Va. 1985).
159. See United States v. Moody, 762 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (mentioning that
the defendant's attorney suggested that the Senate Judiciary Committee appoint an "independent
judicial officer" to preside over the trial in order for there to be an impartial panel to hear the case).
160. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
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between citizens of the same State.
B.

State Cases

State courts have experimented in the past with creating special
judicial panels to adjudicate a dispute when all judges in the state judicial
However, conflicts
system were forced to disqualify themselves.'
of all state
or
pensions
salaries
the
involves
the
case
again arise when
62
judges.
One solution is for the case to be transferred to the federal system
and to allow federal district court and appellate level judges to hear such
disputes. The federal judges would be unaffected by the outcome of the
case and are entirely competent to hear this type of case because they
already make determinations based on state law in diversity cases. Article
I of the Constitution, however, prevents federal judges from hearing
cases which deal with state salaries or pensions where no federal statute
is applicable.' 63 Since these suits are often between citizens of the same
state, diversity jurisdiction does not exist. The Constitution would have
to be amended to expand federal jurisdiction to hear such cases. The
amendment proposed above addresses this problem.
C. Administrative Adjudications
Some jurisdictions confront the problem of the Rule of Necessity
being used in an administrative agency or board by having the state
courts review the decision of the agency or board with heightened
scrutiny." 4 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such a
"procedural safeguard" does not guarantee that one will receive a fair
adjudication in the original tribunal."'

161. See Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Tex. 1925) (noting that since all members of the
court system were disqualified due to their membership in a fraternal organization, a panel of three
women was created by the Governor to act as Special Associate Justices); Peterson v. Knutson, 233
N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 1975) (utilizing state district court judges to decide a controversy over an
election of state supreme court justices).
162. See Board of Trustees v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 1985); Kremer v. Barbieri, 411 A.2d
558 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), aff'd, 417 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1980); Oaldey v. Gainer, 331 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va.
1985).
163. U.S. CONsT. art. III.

164. Barker v. Secretary of State's Office, 752 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); see 4 DAvis,
supra note 131, at § 19.9.
165. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61 (1972) (holding that a review by a
County Court of Common Pleas does not guarantee that the petitioner will get a fair hearing in a
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Several jurisdictions already use a solution for the instance when
one or more members of a board or agency may have to disqualify or
recuse themselves due to a conflict of interest. This solution is simply to
appoint another person to sit in the place of the disqualified member,"6
or to pick an arbitrator to settle the dispute. 67 This remedy should be

introduced into those jurisdictions which do not have any other
altematives. 6'
69
This procedure currently does not exist on the federal level.
There, the dilemma could be remedied by a presidential appointment
with approval by the Senate, or even by adjudication of the conflict
through a Senate committee or subcommittee for swifter resolution. The

following could be a model:
AN ACT, TO ELIMINATE THE RULE OF NECESSITY IN THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT.

In the event an employee is disqualified under 5 U.S.C. § 556,
and no mechanism exists for the case to be heard other than through
such an empowered agency, the President, with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate shall appoint replacement employees to adjudicate the
matter.
D.

Executive

A solution does exist for resolving the dilemma when a single
executive official has the authority to decide or adjudicate a matter.
States could amend their constitutions to allow the lieutenant governor,

or a line of executive branch officials to make the decision in such
instances. Many states already contain clauses in their statutes and
constitutions that allow the lieutenant governor to act as governor when

mayor's court where the mayor has a financial interest in the proceedings).
166. See Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1983); Easter House v. Department
of Children & Family Servs., 561 N.E.2d 1266 (I11.App. Ct. 1990); General Motors Corp. v. Rosa,

624 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1993); County of Westchester v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 605
N.Y.S.2d 316 (App. Div. 1993); Kayatt v. Dinkins, 560 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Sup. Ct. 1990); Sherman v.
Kaiser, 664 A.2d 221 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995); Michael Asimow, Toward a New California
Administrative ProcedureAct: Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1150 (1992).
167. See Salisbury v. Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
168. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights, 796 S.W.2d 52 (MQ, Ct. App. 1990);
State ex rel. Powell v. Wallace, 718 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
169. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. FAA, 772 F.2d
1508 (11th Cir. 1985).
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the governor is incapacitated or absent from the jurisdiction. 7" The
constitutions only need to be amended to also include conflict of interest.
The same arrangement could be made for mayors and other municipal
officials.
V.

CONCLUSION

In our judicial system, we heavily depend on the prudence and
wisdom of judges to reach fair and just resolutions to complicated
disputes. It is hoped that judges can rise above their own personal biases
and interests in most situations to reach a fair result."' However, it is
unfair for a judge to be put in such a situation. It must be uncomfortable
for a judge to be placed in a position of determining whether his or her
salary should be increased according to the law, knowing that if he or
she were to rule in favor of an increase, the judge would be soundly
criticized, although the correct decision was made.
Today's judicial disqualification statutes and ethical codes mandate
that a judge should not hear a case in which the "impartiality" may be
questioned." : The Rule of Necessity completely contradicts this
concept by forcing judges to rule in situations where their impartiality is
questioned. Unfortunately, it is not possible to completely eradicate the
Rule of Necessity. Certain situations may occur where the Rule will have
to be utilized because it would truly be impossible to find an adjudicator
with no interest in the outcome. However, the Rule's application
should be severely restricted, and therefore, be less "necessary" than it
is today.
Thomas McKevitt*

170. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. 5, § 127; ARK. CONsT. amend. 6, § 4; HAw. CONST. art. 5, § 4;
ILL. CONST. art. 5, § 6; MO. CONST. art. 4 (Vernon 1995); NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 16; N.Y. CONST.
art. 4, § 5; S.D. CONsT. art. 4, § 6.; IDAHO CODE § 67-805A (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 10.2,
§ 2 (West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-11.1 (1993).
171. See Kremer v. Barbieri, 411 A.2d 558 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), aff'd, 417 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1980)
(holding that judges were not entitled to a salary increase).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (1990).
173. See United States v. Zuger, 602 F. Supp. 889, 892 (D. Conn. 1984) (holding that the
judge's status as an employee of the United States did not invalidate his ability to hear the case),
aff'd, 755 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 805 (1985).
* The author would like to thank Monroe H. Freedman, the Howard Lichtenstein
Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics at the Hofstra University School of Law for his advice and
comments in the preparation and writing of this Note. Special thanks as well to Professor Roy Simon
of Hofstra, Kenneth Bresler, and Jordan Resnick for their assistance.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 5

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss3/5

28

